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Abstract
In this paper, we study a class of risk-sensitive mean-field stochastic differential games. We show
that under appropriate regularity conditions, the mean-field value of the stochastic differential game with
exponentiated integral cost functional coincides with the value function described by a Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equation with an additional quadratic term. We provide an explicit solution of the mean-
field best response when the instantaneous cost functions are log-quadratic and the state dynamics are
affine in the control. An equivalent mean-field risk-neutral problem is formulated and the corresponding
mean-field equilibria are characterized in terms of backward-forward macroscopic McKean-Vlasov
equations, Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equations, and HJB equations. We provide numerical examples
on the mean field behavior to illustrate both linear and McKean-Vlasov dynamics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most formulations of mean-field (MF) models such as anonymous sequential population games
[19], [7], MF stochastic controls [17], [15], [36], MF optimization, MF teams [33], MF stochastic
games [34], [1], [33], [31], MF stochastic difference games [14], and MF stochastic differential
games [23], [13], [32] have been of risk-neutral type where the cost (or payoff, utility) functions
to be minimized (or to be maximized) are the expected values of stage-additive loss functions.
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2Not all behavior, however, can be captured by risk-neutral cost functions. One way of captur-
ing risk-seeking or risk-averse behavior is by exponentiating loss functions before expectation
(see [2], [18] and the references therein).
The particular risk-sensitive mean-field stochastic differential game that we consider in this
paper involves an exponential term in the stochastic long-term cost function. This approach was
first taken by Jacobson in [18], when considering the risk-sensitive Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian
(LQG) problem with state feedback. Jacobson demonstrated a link between the exponential cost
criterion and deterministic linear-quadratic differential games. He showed that the risk-sensitive
approach provides a method for varying the robustness of the controller and noted that in the
case of no risk, or risk-neutral case, the well known LQR solution would result (see, for follow-
up work on risk-sensitive stochastic control problems with noisy state measurements, [35], [6],
[27]).
In this paper, we examine the risk-sensitive stochastic differential game in a regime of large
population of players. We first present a mean-field stochastic differential game model where the
players are coupled not only via their risk-sensitive cost functionals but also via their states. The
main coupling term is the mean-field process, also called the occupancy process or population
profile process. Each player reacts to the mean field or a subset of the mean field generated by
the states of the other players in an area, and at the same time the mean field evolves according
to a controlled Kolmogorov forward equation.
Our contribution can be summarized as follows. Using a particular structure of state dynamics,
we derive the mean-field limit of the individual state dynamics leading to a non-linear controlled
macroscopic McKean-Vlasov equation; see [21]. Combining this with a limiting risk-sensitive
cost functional, we arrive at the mean-field response framework, and establish its compatibility
with the density distribution using the controlled Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov forward equation.
The mean-field equilibria are characterized by coupled backward-forward equations. In general a
backward-forward system may not have solution (a simple example is provided in section III-D).
An explicit solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation is provided for the affine-
exponentiated-Gaussian mean-field problem. An equivalent risk-neutral mean-field problem (in
terms of value function) is formulated and the solution of the mean-field game problem is
characterized. Finally, we provide a sufficiency condition for having at most one smooth solution
to the risk-sensitive mean field system in the local sense.
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3The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the model description.
We provide an overview of the mean-field convergence result in Section II-A. In Section III, we
present the risk-sensitive mean-field stochastic differential game formulation and its equivalences.
In Section IV, we analyze a special class of risk-sensitive mean-field games where the state
dynamics are linear and independent of the mean field. In Section V, we provide a numerical
example, and section VI concludes the paper. An appendix includes proofs of two main results
in the main body of the paper. We summarize some of the notations used in the paper in Table
I.
II. THE PROBLEM SETTING
We consider a class of n−person stochastic differential games, where Player j’s individual
state, xnj , evolves according to the Itoˆ stochastic differential equation (S) as follows:
dxnj (t) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
fji(t, x
n
j (t), u
n
j (t), x
n
i (t))dt+
√

n
n∑
i=1
σji(t, x
n
j (t), u
n
j (t), x
n
i (t))dBj(t),
xnj (0) = xj,0 ∈ X ⊆ Rk, k ≥ 1, j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
(S)
where xnj (t) is the k-dimensional state of Player j; u
n
j (t) ∈ Uj, is the control of Player j at
time t with Uj being a subset of the pj-dimensional Euclidean space Rpj ; Bj(t) are mutually
independent standard Brownian motion processes in Rk; and  is a small positive parameter,
which will play a role in the analysis in the later sections. We will assume in (S) that there is
some symmetry in fji and σji, in the sense that there exist f and σ (conditions on which will
be specified shortly) such that for all j and i,
fji(t, x
n
j (t), u
n
j (t), x
n
i (t)) ≡ f(t, xnj (t), unj (t), xni (t))
and
σji(t, x
n
j (t), u
n
j (t), x
n
i (t)) ≡ σ(t, xnj (t), unj (t), xni (t)) .
The system (S) is a controlled McKean-Vlasov dynamics. Historically, the McKean-Vlasov
stochastic differential equation (SDE) is a kind of mean field forward SDE suggested by Kac
in 1956 as a stochastic toy model for the Vlasov kinetic equation of plasma and the study of
which was initiated by McKean in 1966. Since then, many authors have made contributions to
McKean-Vlasov type SDEs and related applications [20], [10].
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4TABLE I
SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS
Symbol Meaning
f drift function (finite dimensional)
σ diffusion function (finite dimensional)
xnj (t) state of Player j in a population of size n
x¯j(t) solution of macroscopic McKean-Vlasov equation
xj(t) limit of state process xnj (t)
Uj space of feasible control actions of Player j
γ˜j state feedback strategy of Player j
γ¯j individual state-feedback strategy of Player j
Γ˜j set of admissible state feedback strategies of Player j
Γ¯j set of admissible individual state-feedback strategies of Player j
uj control action of Player j under a generic control strategy
c instantaneous cost function
g terminal cost function
δ risk-sensitivity index
Bj standard Brownian motion process for Player j’s dynamics
E Expectation operator
L risk-sensitive cost functional
∂x partial derivative with respect to x (gradient)
∂2xx second partial derivative (Hessian operator) with the respect to x
x′ transpose of x
mnt empirical measure of the states of the players
mt limit of mnt when n→∞
mn limit of mnt when t→∞
tr(M ) trace of a square matrix M , i.e., tr(M) :=
∑
iMii.
A  B A−B is positive definite, where A, B are square symmetric matrices of the same dimension.
The uncontrolled version of state dynamics (S) captures many interesting problems involving
interactions between agents. We list below a few examples.
Example 1 (Stochastic Kuramoto model). Consider n oscillators where each of the oscillators is
considered to have its own intrinsic natural frequency ωj , and each is coupled symmetrically to
all other oscillators. For fji(xi, ui, xj) = f(xi, ui, xj) = K sin(xj − xi) + ωj and σji a constant
in (S), the state dynamics without control is known as (stochastic) Kuramoto oscillator [22]
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5where the goal is convergence to some common value (consensus) or alignment of the players’
parameters. The stochastic Kuramoto model is given by
dθj(t) =
(
ωj(t) +
K
n
n∑
i=1
sin(θi(t)− θj(t))
)
dt+DdBj(t),
where D,K > 0.
Example 2 (Stochastic Cucker-Smale dynamics:). Consider a population, say of birds or fish
that move in the three dimensional space. It has been observed that for some initial conditions,
for example on their positions and velocities, the state of the flock converges to one in which
all birds fly with the same velocity. See, for example, Cucker-Smale flocking dynamics [9], [8]
where each vector xi = (yi, vi) is composed of position dynamics and velocity dynamics of
the corresponding player. For f(xi, ui, xj) = (2+ ‖ xj − xi ‖2)−αc(xj − xi) in (S), where
 > 0, α > 0 and c(·) is a continuous function, one arrives at a generic class of consensus
algorithms developed for flocking problems.
Example 3 (Temperature dynamics for energy-efficient buildings). Consider a heating system
serving a finite number of zones. In each zone, the goal is to maintain a certain temperature.
Denote by Tj the temperature of zone j, and by T ext the ambient temperature. The law of
conservation of energy can be written down as the following equation for zone j,
dTj(t) = σdBj(t) +
[
rj(t) +
γ
β
(T ext(t)− Tj(t)) +
∑
i 6=j
αij(t)(Ti(t)− Tj(t))
]
dt,
where rj denotes the heat input rate of the heater in zone j, γ, β > 0, αij is the thermal
conductance between zone i and zone j and σ is a small variance term. The evolution of the
temperature has a McKean-Vlasov structure of the type in system (S). We can introduce a control
variable into rj such that the heater can be turned on and off in each zone.
The three examples above can be viewed as special cases of the system (S). The controlled
dynamics in (S) allows one to address several interesting questions. For example, how to control
the flocking dynamics and consensus algorithms of the first two examples above to a certain
target? How to control the temperature in the third example in order to achieve a specific thermal
comfort while minimizing energy cost? In order to define the controlled dynamical system in
precise terms, we have to specify the nature of information that players are allowed in the choice
of their control at each point in time. This brings us to the first definition below.
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6Definition 1. A state-feedback strategy for Player j is a mapping γ˜j : R+ × (Rk)n −→ Uj ,
whereas an individual state-feedback strategy for Player j is a mapping γ¯j : R+ ×Rk −→ Uj.
Note that the individual state-feedback strategy involves only the self state of a player, whereas
the state-feedback strategy involves the entire nk−dimensional state vector. The individual
strategy spaces in each case have to be chosen in such a way that the resulting system of
stochastic differential equations (S) admits a unique solution (in the sense specified shortly)
when the players pick their strategies independently; furthermore, the feasible sets are time
invariant and independent of the controls. We denote by Γ¯j the set of such admissible control
laws γ¯j : [0, T ] × Rk → Uj for Player j; a similar set, Γ˜j , can be defined for state-feedback
strategies γ˜j .
We assume the following standard conditions on f, σ, γ¯j and the action sets Uj , for all j =
1, 2, · · · , n.
(i) f is C1 in (t, x, u,m), and Lipschitz in (x, u,m).
(ii) The entries of the matrix σ are C2 and σσ′ is strictly positive;
(iii) f, ∂xf are uniformly bounded;
(iv) Uj is non-empty, closed and bounded;
(v) γ¯j : [0, T ]× Rk −→ Uj is piecewise continuous in t and Lipschitz in x.
Normally, when we have a cost function for Player j, which depends also on the state variables
of the other players, either directly, or implicitly through the coupling of the state dynamics (as
in (S)), then any state-feedback Nash equilibrium solution will generally depend not only on
self states but also on the other states, i.e., it will not be in the set Γ¯j, j = 1, · · · , n. However,
this paper aims to characterize the solution in the high-population regime (i.e., as n → ∞) in
which case the dependence on other players’ states will be through the distribution of the player
states. Hence each player will respond (in an optimal, cost minimizing manner) to the behavior
of the mass population and not to behaviors of individual players. Validity of this property will
be established later in Section III of the paper, but in anticipation of this, we first introduce the
quantity
mnt =
1
n
n∑
j=1
δxnj (t), (1)
as an empirical measure of the collection of states of the players, where δ is a Dirac measure
on the state space. This enables us to introduce the long-term cost function of Player j (to be
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7minimized by him) in terms of only the self variables (xj and uj) and mnt , t ≥ 0, where the
latter can be viewed as an exogenous process (not directly influenced by Player j). But we first
introduce a mean-field representation of the dynamics (S), which uses mnt and will be used in
the description of the cost.
A. Mean-field representation
The system (S) can be written into a measure representation using the formula∫
φ(w)
[
n∑
i=1
ω¯iδxi
]
(dw) =
n∑
i=1
ω¯iφ(xi),
where δz, z ∈ X is a Dirac measure concentrated at z, φ is a measurable bounded function
defined on the state space and ω¯i ∈ R. Then, the system (S) reduces to the system
dxnj (t) =
(∫
w
f(t, xnj (t), u
n
j (t), w)
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
δxni (t)
]
(dw)
)
dt
+
√

(∫
w
σ(t, xnj (t), u
n
j (t), w)
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
δxni (t)
]
(dw)
)
dBj(t),
xnj (0) = xj,0 ∈ Rk, k ≥ 1, j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
which, by (1), is equivalent to the following system (SM):
dxnj (t) =
(∫
w
f(t, xnj (t), u
n
j (t), w)m
n
t (dw)
)
dt
+
√

(∫
w
σ(t, xnj (t), u
n
j (t), w)m
n
t (dw)
)
dBj(t),
xnj (0) = xj,0 ∈ Rk, k ≥ 1, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
(SM)
The above representation of the system (SM) can be seen as a controlled interacting particles
representation of a macroscopic McKean-Vlasov equation where mnt represents the discrete
density of the population. Next, we address the mean field convergence of the population profile
process mn. To do so, we introduce the key notion of indistinguishability.
Definition 2 (Indistinguishability). We say that a family of processes (xn1 , xn2 , . . . , xnn) is indis-
tinguishable (or exchangeable) if the law of xn is invariant by permutation over the index set
{1, . . . , n}.
The solution of (S) obtained under fixed control u(·) generates indistinguishable processes. For
any permutation pi over {1, 2, . . . , n}, one has L(xnj1 , . . . , xnjn) = L(xnpi(j1), . . . , xnpi(jn)), where
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8L(X) denotes the law of the random variable X. For indistinguishable (exchangeable) processes,
the convergence of the empirical measure has been widely studied (see [29] and the references
therein). To preserve this property for the controlled system we restrict ourselves to admissible
homogeneous controls. Then, the mean field convergence is equivalent to the existence of a
random measure µ such that the system is µ−chaotic, i.e.,
lim
n
∫ L∏
l=1
φl(x
n
jl
)µn(dxn) =
L∏
l=1
(∫
φldµ
)
,
for any fixed natural number L ≥ 2 and a collection of measurable bounded functions {φl}1≤l≤L
defined over the state space X . Following the indistinguishability property, one has that the law
of xnj = (x
n
j (t), t ≥ 0) is E[mn]. The same result is obtained by proving the weak convergence of
the individual state dynamics to a macroscopic McKean-Vlasov equation (see later Proposition 5).
Then, when the initial states are i.i.d. and given some homogeneous control actions u, the solution
of the state dynamics generates an indistinguishable random process and the weak convergence
of the population profile process mn to µ is equivalent to the µ−chaoticity. For general results
on mean-field convergence of controlled stochastic differential equations, we refer to [14]. These
processes depend implicitly on the strategies used by the players. Note that an admissible control
law γ¯ may depend on time t, the value of the individual state xj(t) and the mean-field process
mt. The weak convergence of the process mn implies the weak convergence of its marginal
mnt and one can characterize the distribution of mt by the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (FPK)
equation:
∂tmt +D
1
x
(
mt
∫
w
f(t, x, u(t), w)mt(dw)
)
=

2
D2xx
(
mt
(∫
w
σ′(t, x, u(t), w)mt(dw)
)
·
(∫
w
σ(t, x, u(t), w)mt(dw)
))
. (2)
Here f(·) ∈ Rk, which we denote by (fk′(·))1≤k′≤k, where fk′ is scalar. We let
σ[t, x, u(t),mt] :=
∫
w
σ(t, x, u(t), w)mt(dw),
Γ(·) := σ(·)σ′(·) is a square matrix with dimension k × k. The term D1x(·) denotes
k∑
k′=1
∂
∂xk′
(
mt
∫
w
fk′(t, x, u(t), w)mt(dw)
)
,
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9and the last term on D2xx(·) is
k∑
k′′=1
k∑
k′=1
∂2
∂xk′∂xk′′
(mtΓk′k′′(·)) .
In the one-dimensional case, the terms D1, D2 reduce to the divergence “div” and the Laplacian
operator ∆, respectively.
It is important to note that the existence of a unique rest point (distribution) in FPK does not
automatically imply that the mean-field converges to the rest point when t goes to infinity. This
is because the rest point may not be stable.
Remark 1. In mathematical physics, convergence to an independent and identically distributed
system is sometimes referred to as chaoticity [28], [29], [11], and the fact that chaoticity at the
initial time implies chaoticity at further times is called propagation of chaos. However in our
setting the chaoticity property needs to be studied together with the controls of the players. In
general the chaoticity property may not hold. One particular case should be mentioned, which is
when the rest point m∗ is related to the δm∗− chaoticity. If the mean-field dynamics has a unique
global attractor m∗, then the propagation of chaos property holds for the measure δm∗ . Beyond
this particular case, one may have multiple rest points but also the double limit, limn limtmnt
may differ from the one when the order is swapped, limt limnmnt leading a non-commutative
diagram. Thus, a deep study of the underlying dynamical system is required if one wants to
analyze a performance metric for a stationary regime. A counterexample of non-commutativity
of the double limit is provided in [30].
B. Cost Function
We now introduce the cost functions for the differential game. Risk-sensitive behaviors can
be captured by cost functions which exponentiate loss functions before the expectation operator.
For each t ∈ [0, T ], and mnt , xj initialized at a generic feasible pair m,x at t, the risk-sensitive
cost function for Player j is given by
L(γ¯j,m
n
[t,T ]; t, x,m) = δ logE
e 1δ [g(xT ) +
∫ T
t
c(s, xnj (s), u
n
j (s),m
n(s)) ds]
∣∣∣∣∣ xj(t) = x,mnt = m
 , (3)
where c(·) is the instantaneous cost at time s; g(·) is the terminal cost; δ > 0 is the risk-
sensitivity index; mn[t,T ] denotes the process {mns , t ≤ s ≤ T}; and unj (s) = γ¯j(s, xnj (s),mn(s)),
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with γ¯j ∈ Γ¯j . Note that because of the symmetry assumption across players, the cost function of
Player j is not indexed by j, since it is in the same structural form for all players. This is still
a game problem (and not a team problem), however, because each such cost function depends
only on the self variables (indexed by j for Player j) as well as the common population variable
mn.
We assume the following standard conditions on c and g.
(vi) c is C1 in (t, x, u,m); g is C2 in x; c, g are non-negative;
(vii) c, ∂xc, g, ∂xg are uniformly bounded.
The cost function (3) is called the risk-sensitive cost functional or the exponentiated integral
cost, which measures risk-sensitivity for the long-run and not at each instant of time (see [18],
[35], [6], [2]). We note that the McKean-Vlasov mean field game considered here differs from
the model in [16]; specifically, in this paper, the volatility term in (SM) is a function of state,
control and the mean field, and further, the cost functional is of the risk-sensitive type.
Remark 2 (Connection with mean-variance cost). Consider the function cλ : λ 7−→ 1
λ
log(EeλC).
It is obvious that the risk-sensitive cost cλ takes into consideration all the moments of the cost
C, and not only its mean value. Around zero, the Taylor expansion of cλ is given by
cλ ≈︸︷︷︸
λ∼0
E(C) +
λ
2
var(C) + o(λ),
where the important terms are the mean cost and the variance of the cost for small λ. Hence
risk-sensitive cost entails a weighted sum of the mean and variance of the cost, to some level
of approximation.
With the dynamics (SM) and cost functionals as introduced, we seek an individual state-
feedback non-cooperative Nash equilibrium {γ¯∗i , i ∈ {1, · · · , n}}, satisfying the set of inequali-
ties
L(γ¯∗j ,m
n
[0,T ]; 0, xj,0,m) ≤ L(γ¯j, m˜n,j[0,T ]; 0, xj,0,m), (4)
for all γ¯j ∈ Γ¯j, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, where mn[0, T ] is generated by the γ¯∗j ’s, and m˜n,j[0,T ] by (γ¯, γ¯∗−j),
γ¯∗−j = {γ¯∗i , i = 1, 2, · · · , n, i 6= j}; u∗j and uj are control actions generated by control laws γ¯∗j
and γ¯j , respectively, i.e., u∗j = γ¯
∗
j (t, xj) and uj = γ¯j(t, xj); m
n
t = m
n
t [u
∗] laws are given by
forward FPK equation under the strategy γ¯∗, and m˜n,jt = m˜
n,j
t [uj, u
∗
−j] is the induced measure
under the strategy (γ¯j, γ¯∗−j).
October 11, 2012 DRAFT
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A more stringent equilibrium solution concept is that of strongly time-consistent individual
state-feedback Nash equilibrium satisfying,
L(γ¯∗j ,m
n
[t,T ]; t, xj,m) ≤ L(γ¯j, m˜n,j[t,T ]; t, xj,m), (5)
for all xj ∈ X , t ∈ [0, T ), γ¯j ∈ Γ¯j, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}.
Note that the two measures mnt and m˜
n,j
t differ only in the component j and have a common
term which is 1
n
∑
j′ 6=j δxnj′ (t), which converges in distribution to some measure with a distribution
that is a solution of the forward PFK partial differential equation.
III. RISK-SENSITIVE BEST RESPONSE TO MEAN-FIELD AND EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we present the risk-sensitive mean-field results. We first provide an overview of
the mean-field (feedback) best response for a given mean-field trajectory mn = (mn(s), s ≥ 0).
A mean-field best-response strategy of a generic Player j to a given mean field mnt is a measurable
mapping γ¯∗j satisfying: ∀ γ¯j ∈ Γ¯j , with xj and mnt initialized at xj,0,m, respectively,
L(γ¯∗j ,m
n
[0,T ], 0, xj,0,m) ≤ L(γj,mn[0,T ], 0, xj,0,m).
where law of mnt is given by the forward FPK equation in the whole space X n, and is an exoge-
nous process. Let vn(t, xj,m) = infuj L(uj,m
n
[0,T ], t, xj,m). The next proposition establishes
the risk-sensitive Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation of the risk-sensitive cost function
satisfied by a smooth optimal value function of a generic player. The main difference from the
standard HJB equation is the presence of the term 
2δ
‖ σ∂xjvn ‖2 .
Proposition 1. Suppose that the trajectory of mnt is given. If vn is twice continuously differen-
tiable, then vn is solution of the risk-sensitive HJB equation
∂tv
n + inf
uj
{
f · ∂xjvn +

2
tr(σσ′∂2xjxjv
n
j ) +

2δ
‖ σ∂xjvn ‖2 +c
}
= 0,
vn(T, xj) = g(xj).
Moreover, any strategy satisfying
γ¯nj (·) ∈ arg min
uj
{
f · ∂xjvn +

2
tr(σσ′∂2xjxjv
n) +

2δ
‖ σ∂xjvn ‖2 +c
}
,
constitutes a best response strategy to the mean-field mn.
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Proof of Proposition 1: For feasible initial conditions x and m, we define
φn(t, x,m) := inf
unj
E
(
e
1
δ
[g(xT )+
∫ T
t c(s,x
n(s),uj(t),m
n
s ) ds] | xj(t) = x,mnt = m
)
.
It is clear that vn(t, xj,m) = inf L = δ log φn(t, xj,m). Under the regularity assumptions of
Section II, the function φn is C1 in t and C2 in x. Using Itoˆ’s formula,
dφn(t, xj) = [∂tφ
n(t, xj) + f · ∂xjφn +

2
tr(σσ′∂2xjxjφ
n)]dt.
Using the Ito-Dynkin’s formula (see [26], [6], [27]), the dynamic optimization yields
inf
u¯j
{dφn + 1
δ
cφndt} = 0.
Thus, one obtains
∂tφ
n + inf
uj
{
f · ∂xjφn +

2
tr(σσ′∂2xxφ
n) +
1
δ
cφn
}
= 0,
φn(T, xj) = e
1
δ
g(xj).
To establish the connection with the risk-sensitive cost value, we use the relation φn = e
1
δ
vn .
One can compute the partial derivatives:
∂tφ
n = (∂tv
n)
1
δ
φn, ∂xjφ
n =
(
∂xjv
n
) 1
δ
φn,
and
∂2xjxjφ
n =
(
∂2xjxjv
n
) 1
δ
φn +
1
δ2
(
∂xjv
n
)′ (
∂xjv
n
)
φn,
where the latter immediately yields
tr(∂2xjxjφ
nσσ′) = tr(∂2xjxjv
nσσ′)
1
δ
φn +
1
δ2
‖ σ∂xjvn ‖2 φn.
Combining together and dividing by φn/δ, we arrive at the HJB equation (6).
Remark 3. Let us introduce the Hamiltonian H as
H(t, x, p˜, M˜) = inf
u
{
p˜ · f + 
2
tr(σσ′M˜) +

2δ
‖ σp˜ ‖2 +c
}
,
for a vector p˜ and a matrix M˜ which is the same as the Hessian of vn.
If σ does not depend on the control, then the above expression reduces to
inf
u
{p˜ · f + c}+ 
2
tr(σσ′M˜) +

2δ
‖ σp˜ ‖2,
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and the term to be minimized is H2(t, x, p˜, M˜) = infu{p˜ · f + c}, which is related to the
Legendre-Fenchel transform for linear dynamics, i.e., the case where f is linear in the control
u.
In that case,
∂p˜H
2(t, x, p˜, M˜) = αu∗
for some non-singular α of proper dimension. This says that the derivative of the modified
Hamiltonian is related to the optimal feedback control. Now, for non-linear drift f the same
technique can be used but the function f needs to be inverted to obtain a generic closed form
expression the optimal feedback control and is given by
u∗j = g˜
−1(∂p˜H2(t, x, p˜, M˜)),
where g˜−1 is the inverse of the map
u 7−→ f(t, x, u,m).
This generic expression of the optimal control will play an important role in non-linear McKean-
Vlasov mean field games.
The next proposition provides the best-response control to the affine-quadratic in u-exponentiated
cost-Gaussian mean-field game, and the proposition that follows that deals with the case of affine-
quadratic in both u and x.
Proposition 2. Suppose σ(t, x) = σ(t) and
f(t, xj, uj,m) = f¯(t, xj,m) +B(t, xj,m)uj,
c(t, xj, uj,m) = c¯(t, xj,m)+ ‖ uj ‖2 .
Then, the best-response control of Player j is γ¯n,∗j = −12B∂xjvn.
Proof: Following Proposition 1, we know
u¯n,∗j = γ¯
n,∗
j (·) ∈ arg min
uj
{c(t, xj(t), uj(t),mt) + f(t, xj(t), uj,mt) · ∂xjvn}.
With the assumptions on σ, f, c, g, the condition reduces to
arg min
uj
{
[f¯ +Buj]∂xjv
n + c¯+ ‖ uj ‖2
}
.
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and hence, we obtain γ¯n,∗j = −12B∂xjvn by convexity and coercivity of the mapping uj 7−→
[f¯ +Buj]∂xjv
n + c¯+ ‖ uj ‖2 .
Proposition 3 (Explicit optimal control and cost, [2]).
Consider the risk-sensitive mean-field stochastic game described in Proposition 2 with f¯ =
A(t)x, B a constant matrix, c = x′Q(t)x, Q(t) ≥ 0, g(x) = x′QTx,QT ≥ 0, where the
symmetric matrix Q(·) is continuous. Then, the solution to HJB equation in Proposition 1
(whenever it exists) is given by vn(t, x) = x′Z(t)x + 
∫ T
t
tr(Z(s)σσ′) ds. where Z(s) is the
nonnegative definite solution of the generalized Riccati differential equation
Z˙ + A′Z + ZA+Q− Z
(
BB′ − 1
ρ2
σσ′
)
Z = 0, Z(T ) = QT ,
where ρ = ( δ
2
)1/2 and the optimal response strategy is
u∗j(t) = γ¯
∗
j (·) = −B′Zx. (6)
Using Proposition 3, one has the following result for any given trajectory (mnt )t≥0, which
enters the cost function in a particular way.
Proposition 4. If c is in the form c = x′(Q(t)−Λ(t,mnt ))x, where Λ is symmetric and continuous
in (t,m), then the generalized Riccati equation becomes
Z˙∗ + A′Z∗ + Z∗A+Q− Λ(t,mnt )− Z∗
(
BB′ − 1
ρ2
σσ′
)
Z∗ = 0, Z∗(T ) = QT ,
and
vn(t, x) = x′Z∗x+ 
∫ T
t
tr(Z∗(s)σσ′) ds.
A. Macroscopic McKean-Vlasov equation
Since the controls used by the players influence the mean-field limit via the state dynamics, we
need to characterize the evolution of the mean-field limit as a function of the controls. The law
of mt is the solution of the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equation given by (2) and the individual
state dynamics follows the so-called macroscopic McKean-Vlasov equation
dx¯j(t) =
(∫
w
f(t, x¯j(t), u
∗
j(t), w)mt(dw)
)
dt+
√

(∫
w
σ(t, x¯j(t), u
∗
j(t), w)mt(dw)
)
dBj(t). (7)
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In order to obtain an error bound, we introduce the following notion: Given two measures µ
and ν the Monge-Kontorovich metric (also called Wasserstein metric) between µ and ν is
W1(µ, ν) = inf
X∼µ,Y∼ν
E|X − Y |.
In other words, let E(µ, ν) be the set of probability measures P on the product space such that
the image of P under the projection on the first argument (resp. on the second argument) is µ
(resp. ν). Then,
W1(µ, ν) = inf
P∈E(µ,ν)
∫ ∫
|z − z′|P(dz, dz′). (8)
This is known indeed as a distance (it can be checked that the separation, the triangle inequality
and positivity properties are satisfied) and it metricizes the weak topology.
Proposition 5. Under the conditions (i)-(vii), the following holds: For any t, if the control law
γ∗j (·) is used, then there exists y˜t > 0 such that
E
(‖ xnj (t)− x˜j(t) ‖) ≤ y˜t√n.
Moreover, for any T <∞, there exists CT > 0 such that
W1
(L((xnj (t))t∈[0,T ]),L((x˜j(t))t∈[0,T ])) ≤ CT√n, (9)
where L(Xt) denotes the law of the random variable Xt.
The last inequality says that the error bound is at most of O( 1√
n
) for any fixed compact interval.
The proof of this assertion follows the following steps: Let xnj (t) and x˜j(t) be the solutions of the
two SDEs with initial gap less than 1√
n
. Then, we take the difference between the two solutions.
In a second step, use triangle inequality of norms and take the expectation. Gronwall inequality
allows one to complete the proof. A detailed proof is provided in the Appendix.
1) Risk-sensitive mean-field cost: Based on the fact that mnt converges weakly to mt under
the admissible controls (unj (s), s ≥ 0) −→ (uj(s), s ≥ 0) when n goes to infinity, one can
show the weak convergence of the risk-sensitive cost function (3) under the regularity conditions
(vi) and (vii) on functions c and g, i.e., as n→∞,
L(γ¯j,m
n
[t,T ]; t, x,m) → L(uj,m[t,T ], t, x,m)
= δ logE
(
e
1
δ
[g(xj(T ))+
∫ T
t c(s,xj(s),uj(s),ms) ds]
∣∣∣∣ xj(t) = x,mt = m) .
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Based on this limiting cost, we can construct the best response to mean field in the limit.
Given {ms}s∈[t,T ], we minimize L(uj,m[t,T ]; t, x,m) subject to the state-dynamics constraints.
B. Fixed-point problem
We now define the mean field equilibrium problem as the following fixed-point problem.
Definition 3. The mean field equilibrium problem (P) is one where each player solves the optimal
control problem, i.e.,
infuj δ logE
(
e
1
δ
[g(xj(T ))+
∫ T
t c(s,xj(s),uj(s),m
∗
s) ds]
∣∣∣∣ xj(t) = x,mt = m) ,
subject to the dynamics of xj(t) given by the dynamics in Section III-A, where the mean field
mt is replaced by m∗t and m¯
∗
t is the mean of the optimal mean field trajectory. The optimal
feedback control u∗j [t, x,m
∗] depends on m∗, and m∗ is the mean field reproduced by all the
u∗j , i.e., m
∗
t = m[t, u
∗] solution of the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov forward equation (2). The
equilibrium is called an individual feedback mean field equilibrium if every player adopts an
individual state-feedback strategy.
Note that this problem differs from the risk-sensitive mean field stochastic optimal control
problem where the objective is
δ logE
(
e
1
δ
[g(xj(T ))+
∫ T
t c(s,xj(s),uj(s),ms[u]) ds]
∣∣∣∣ xj(t) = x,mt = m) ,
with ms[u] the distribution of the state dynamics xj(s) driven by the control uj.
C. Risk-sensitive FPK-McV equations
The regular solutions to problem (P) introduced above are solutions to HJB backward equation
combined with FPK equation and macroscopic McKean-Vlasov version of the limiting individual
dynamics, i.e.,
dxj(t) =
(∫
w
f(t, xj(t), u
∗
j(t), w)mt(dw)
)
dt
+
√

(∫
w
σ(t, xj(t), u
∗
j(t), w)mt(dw)
)
dBj(t),
xj(0) = xj,0 = x
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0 = ∂tv + inf
uj
{
f · ∂xv + 
2
tr(σσ′∂2xxv) +

2δ
‖ σ∂xv ‖2 +c
}
,
xj := x; v(T, x) = g(x)
∂tmt = −D1x
(
mt
∫
w
f(t, x, u∗, w)mt(dw)
)
+

2
D2xx
(
mt
(∫
w
σ′(t, x, u∗, w)mt(dw)
)
·
(∫
w
σ(t, x, u∗, w)mt(dw)
))
m0(·) fixed.
Then, the question of existence of a solution to the above system arises. This is a backward-
forward system. Very little is known about the existence of a solution to such a system. In
general, a solution may not exist as the following example demonstrates.
D. Non-existence of solution to backward-forward boundary value problems
There are many examples of systems of backward-forward equations which do not admit
solutions. As a very simple example from [37], consider the system:
v˙ = m, m˙ = −v,m(0) = m0; v(T ) = −mT .
It is obvious that the coefficients of this pair of backward-forward differential equations are
all uniformly Lipschitz. However, depending on T , this may not be solvable for m0 6= 0. We can
easily show that for T = kpi + 3pi/4 (k, a nonnegative integer), the above two-point boundary
value problem does not admit a solution for any m0 6= 0 and it admits infinitely many solutions
for m0 = 0.
Following the same ideas, one can show that the system of stochastic differential equations
(SDEs)
dv = mdt+ σdB(t), dm = −vdt+ νdB(t),
where B(t) is the standard Brownian motion in R. With the initial conditions:
m(0) = m0 6= 0; v(T ) = −mT ,
and T = 7pi/4, the system of SDEs has no solution.
This example shows us that the system needs to be normalized and the boundary conditions
will have to be well posed. In view of this, we will introduce the notion of reduced mean field
system in Section IV to establish the existence of equilibrium for a specific class of risk-sensitive
games.
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E. Risk-sensitive mean-field equilibria
Theorem 1. Consider a risk-sensitive mean-field stochastic differential game as formulated
above. Assume that σ = σ(t) and there exists a unique pair (u∗,m∗) such that
(i) The coupled backward-forward PDEs
∂tv
∗ + inf
uj
{
f ∗ · ∂xv∗ + 
2
tr(σσ′∂2xxv
∗) +

2δ
‖ σ∂xv ‖2 +c∗
}
= 0,
v(T, x) = g(x), m∗0(x) fixed.
∂tm
∗
t + D
1
x
(
m∗t
∫
w
f ∗(t, x, u∗, w)m∗t (dw)
)
=

2
D2xx
(
m∗t
(∫
w
σ′m∗t (dw)
)(∫
w
σm∗t (dw)
))
admit a pair a bounded nonnegative solutions v∗,m∗; and
(ii) u∗ minimizes the Hamiltonian, i.e., f(t, x, u,m∗) · ∂xv∗ + c(t, x, u,m∗).
Under these conditions, the pair (u∗,m∗) is a strongly time-consistent mean-field equilibrium
and L(t, u∗,m∗) = v∗. In addition, if c = x′(Q(t) − Λt(mnt ))x where Λ(t, ·) is a measurable
symmetric matrix-valued function, then any convergent subsequence of optimal control laws γ¯α(n)j
leads to a best strategy for m.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Remark 4. This result can be extended to finitely multiple classes of players (see [25], [3], [23]
for discussions). To do so, consider a finite number of classes indexed by θ ∈ Θ. The individual
dynamics are indexed by θ, i.e. the function f becomes fθ and σ becomes σθ. This means that the
indistinguishability property is not satisfied anymore. The law depends on θ (it is not invariant
by permutation of index). However, the invariance property holds within each class. This allows
us to establish a weak convergence of the individual dynamics of each generic player for each
class, and we obtain x˜θ(t). The multi-class mean-field equilibrium will be defined by a system
for each class and the classes are interdependent via the mean field and the value functions per
class.
Limiting behavior with respect to  : We scale the parameters δ,  and ρ such that δ = 2ρ2.
The PDE given in Proposition 1 becomes
∂tv + inf
u
{
f ∗ · ∂xv + 
2
tr(σσ′∂2xxv) +
1
4ρ2
‖ σ∂xv ‖2 +c∗
}
= 0, v(T, x) = g(x).
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When the parameter  goes to zero, one arrives at a deterministic PDE. This situation captures
the large deviation limit:
∂tv + inf
u
{
f ∗ · ∂xv + 1
4ρ2
‖ σ∂xv ‖2 +c∗
}
= 0, v(T, x) = g(x).
F. Equivalent stochastic mean-field problem
In this subsection, we formulate an equivalent (n+1)−player game in which the state dynamics
of the n players are given by the system (ESM) as follows:
dxnj (t) =
(∫
w
f(t, xnj (t), u
n
j (t), w)m
n
t (dw) + σζ(t)
)
dt+
√
σdBj(t),
xnj (0) = xj,0 ∈ Rk, k ≥ 1, j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
(ESM)
where ζ(t) is the control parameter of the “fictitious” (n + 1)−th player. In parallel to (3), we
define the risk-neutral cost function of the n players as follows:
L˜(γ¯j, ζ¯, x
n
j ,m
n
[0,T ]; t, x,m) =
E
(
g(xnj (T )) +
∫ T
t
c(s, xnj (s), u
n
j (s),m
n
s ) ds− ρ2
∫ T
t
‖ ζ(s) ‖2 ds
∣∣∣∣xj(t) = x,mnt = m) ,
(10)
where ζ¯ : [0, T ]×Rk → Un+1 is the individual feedback control strategy of the fictitious Player
n+ 1 that yields an admissible control action ζ(t) in a set of feasible actions Un+1.
Every player j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} minimizes L˜ by taking the worst over the feedback strategy ζ¯
of player n + 1 which is piecewise continuous in t and Lipschitz in xj. We refer to this game
described by (ESM) and (10) as the robust mean-field game. In the following Proposition, we
describe the connection between the mean-field risk-sensitive game problem described in (SM)
and (3) and the robust mean-field game problem described in (ESM) and (10),
Proposition 6. Under the regularity assumptions (i)-(vii), given a mean field mnt , the value
functions of the risk-sensitive game and the robust game problems are identical, and the mean-
field best-response control strategy of the risk-sensitive stochastic differential game is identical
to the one for the corresponding robust mean-field game.
Proof: Let v˜n = infuj supζ L˜(uj, ζ, x
n
j ,m
n
[0,T ], t, xj,m) denote the upper-value function
associated with this robust mean-field game. Then, under the regularity assumptions (i)-(vii),
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if v˜n is C1 in t and C2 in x, it satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equation
inf
u
sup
ζ
{
∂tv˜
n
j + (f + σζ) · ∂xj v˜n + c− ρ2 ‖ ζ ‖2 +

2
tr(∂2xjxj v˜
nσσ′)
}
= 0, (11)
v˜n(T, xj) = g(xj).
Note that (11) can be rewritten as infu supζ H3, where
H3 := H + (σζ) · ∂xj v˜n − ρ2 ‖ ζ ‖2
is the Hamiltonian associated with this robust game.
Since the dependence on u and ζ above are separable, the Isaacs condition (see [4]) holds,
i.e.,
inf
u
sup
ζ
H3 = sup
ζ
inf
u
H3
and hence the function v˜nj satisfies the following after obtaining the best-response strategy for
ζ:
− ∂tv˜n = inf
u
{
f · ∂xj v˜n + c+
1
4ρ2
‖ σ′∂xj v˜n ‖2 +

2
tr(∂2xjxj v˜
nσσ′)
}
. (12)
v˜n(T, xj) = g(xj).
Note that the two PDEs, (12) and the one given in Proposition 1, are identical with ρ2 = δ
2
.
Moreover, the optimal cost and the optimal control laws in the two problems are the same.
Remark 5. The FPK forward equation will have to be modified to include the control of fictitious
player in the robust mean field game formulation accordingly by including the term σζ in (ESM).
Hence the mean field equilibrium solutions to the two games are not necessarily identical.
IV. LINEAR STATE DYNAMICS
In this section, we analyze a specific class of risk-sensitive games where state dynamics are
linear and do not depend explicitly on the mean field. We first state a related result from [24],
[12] for the risk-neutral case.
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Theorem 2 ([24]). Consider the reduced mean field system (rMFG):
∂xv +H(x,∇xv,mt(x)) + σ
2
2
∂2xxv = 0,
∂xmt + div(mt∂pH(x,∇xv,mt(x))− σ
2
2
∂2xxmt = 0,
m0(·) fixed, v(T, ·) fixed,
v,m are 1-periodic.,
x ∈ (0, 1)d := X ,
where H is the Legendre transform (with respect to the control) of the instantaneous cost function.
Suppose that (x, p, z) 7−→ H(x, p, z) is twice continuously differentiable with the respect to
(p, z) and for all (x, p, z) ∈ X × Rp × R∗+, ∂2ppH(x, p, z) 12∂2pzH(x, p, z)
1
2
[∂2pzH(x, p, z)]
′ −1
z
∂zH(x, p, z)
  0
Then, there exists at most one smooth solution to the (rMFG).
Remark 6. We have a number of observations and notes.
• The Hamilitonian function H in the result above requires a special structure. Instead of a
direct dependence on the mean field distribution mt, its dependence on the mean field is
through the value of mt evaluated at state x.
• For global dependence on m, a sufficiency condition for uniqueness can be found in [23]
for the case where the Hamiltonian is separable, i.e., H(x, p,m) = ξ(x, p) + f˜(x,m) with
f˜ monotone in m and ξ strictly convex in p.
• The solution of (rMFG) can be unique even if the above conditions are violated. Further,
the uniqueness condition is independent of the horizon of the game.
• For the linear-quadratic mean field case, it has been shown in [3] that the normalized
system may have a unique i.i.d. solution or infinitely many solutions depending on the
system parameters. See also [5] for recent analysis on risk-neutral linear-quadratic mean
field games.
The next result provides the counterpart of Theorem 2 in the risk-sensitive case. It provides
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Fig. 1. The evolution of distribution m∗t , 0 ≤ t ≤ 5,−19 ≤ x ≤ 21.
sufficient conditions for having at most one smooth solution in the risk-sensitive mean field
system by exploiting the presence of the additive quadratic term (which is strictly convex in p).
Theorem 3. Consider the risk-sensitive (reduced) mean field system (RS-rMFG). Let δ > 0,
and H(x, p, z) be twice continuously differentiable in (p, z) ∈ Rd×R+, satisfying the following
conditions:
• H is strictly convex in p,
• H is decreasing in z,
•
(−∂zH
z
) · (∂2ppH)  (∂2pzH − σ22δ p/z)′ · (∂2pzH − σ22δ p/z).
Then, (RS-rMFG) has at most one smooth solution.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Remark 7. We observe that in contrast to Theorem 2 (risk-neutral case), the sufficiency condition
for having at most one smooth solution in (RS-rMFG) now depends on the variance term.
V. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION
In this section, we provide two numerical examples to illustrate the risk-sensitive mean-field
game under affine state dynamics and McKean-Vlasov dynamics.
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Fig. 2. Mean value E(m∗t ) as a function of time, 0 ≤ t ≤ 5.
Fig. 3. Variance of the distribution m∗t as a function of time, 0 ≤ t ≤ 5.
Fig. 4. z(t) as a function of time, 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
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A. Affine state dynamics
We let Player j’s state evolution be described by a decoupled stochastic differential equation
dxnj (t) = uj(t)dt+
√
σdBj(t).
The risk-sensitive cost functional is given by
L(γ¯j,m
n; t, x,m) = δ logEx,m
{
exp
[
1
δ
(
Q(xnj )
2 +
∫ T
0
(q − E(mnt ))(xnj )2(t) + u¯2j(t)dt
)]}
,
where δ,Q, q are positive parameters; hence coupling of the players is only through the cost.
The optimal strategy of Player j has the form of
u¯∗j(t) = −z(t)x, (13)
where z(t) is a solution to the Riccati equation
z˙(t) + q − E(mn)− z2(t)(1− σ2/ρ2) = 0,
with boundary condition z(T ) = Q. An explicit solution is given by
z(t) = −
√
q −M√
L
tan
[√
L
√
q −M(t− T )+ arctan
( √
LQ√
q −M
)]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
where L := 1− σ2/ρ2 and M := E(mn). The FPK-McV equation reduces to
∂tm
∗
t + ∂x(m
∗
t z(t)x(t)) =

2
σ2∂2xxm
∗
t .
We set the parameters as follows: q = 1.2, Q = 0.1, δ = 100, 000, σ = 2.0, T = 5 and  = 5.0.
Let m∗0(x) be a normal distribution N (1, 1) and for every 0 ≤ t ≤ T , m∗t vanishes at infinity.
In Figure 1, we show the evolution of the distribution m∗t and in Figures 2 and 3, we show
the mean and the variance of the distribution which affects the optimal strategies in (13). The
optimal linear feedback z(t) is illustrated in Figure 4. We can observe that the mean value E(m∗t )
monotonically decreases from 1.0 and hence the unit cost on state is monotonically increasing.
As the state cost increases, the control effort becomes relatively cheaper and therefore we can
observe an increment in the magnitude of z(t). However, when the mean value goes beyond
1.08, we observe that the control effort reduces to avoid undershooting in the state.
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B. McKean-Vlasov dynamics
We let the dynamics of an individual player be
dxnj (t) =
(
β
n
n∑
i=1
xni (t) + u
n
j (t)
)
dt+
√
σdBj(t), (14)
and take the risk-sensitive cost function to be
L = δ logE
{
exp
[
1
δ
∫ T
0
q(xnj (t))
2 + (unj (t))
2
]}
.
Note that the cost function is independent of other players’ controls or states. As n → ∞,
under regularity conditions,
lim
n→∞
n∑
i=1
1
n
xni (t) = M(t),
where M(t) is the mean of the population. The feedback optimal control u¯j in response to the
mean field M(t) is characterized by
u¯j(t) = −z(t)xj(t)− k(t),
where
z˙(t) + q − z2(1− σ2/ρ2) = 0, z(T ) = 0,
k˙(t)− z(t)k(t) + z(t)M(t) = 0, k(T ) = 0,
and ρ2 = δ
2
and M(t) =
∫
x∈X xm(x, t)dx. The Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (FPK) equation is
∂tm(x, t) + ∂x
(
m(x, t) (−z(t)x(t)− k(t)) + βm(x, t)
∫
w
wm(w, t)dw
)
=

2
σ2∂2xxm(x, t)
By solving the ODEs, we find that
z(t) = −√q¯tan
(√
qˆ(t− T )
)
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
where q¯ = q/(1− σ2/ρ2) and qˆ = q(1− σ2/ρ2). Let q = r = 1 and we find the solution
k(t) = cos(t−T )
(∫ T
1
m(τ)sec(T − τ)tan(T − τ)dτ −
∫ T
t
m(τ ′)sec(T − τ ′)tan(T − τ ′)dτ ′
)
.
Let σ = 1, ρ = 2, β = 1 and we show in Figure 5 the evolution of the probability density function
m(x, t). The mean M(t) and the variance are shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7, respectively.
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Fig. 5. Evolution of the probability density function m(x, t)
Fig. 6. The mean M(t) under equilibrium solution
Fig. 7. Variance over time under equilibrium solution
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have studied risk-sensitive mean-field stochastic differential games with state dynamics
given by an Itoˆ stochastic differential equation and the cost function being the expected value
of an exponentiated integral.
Using a particular structure of state dynamics, we have shown that the mean-field limit of the
individual state dynamics leads to a controlled macroscopic McKean-Vlasov equation. We have
formulated a risk-sensitive mean-field response framework, and established its compatibility with
the density distribution using the controlled Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov forward equation. The
risk-sensitive mean-field equilibria are characterized by coupled backward-forward equations.
For the general case, the resulting mean field system is very hard to solve (numerically or
analytically) even if the number of equations have been reduced. We have, however, provided
generic explicit forms in the particular case of the affine-exponentiated-Gaussian mean-field
problem. In addition, we have shown that the risk-sensitive problem can be transformed into
a risk-neutral mean-field game problem with the introduction of an additional fictitious player.
This allows one to study a novel class of mean field games, robust mean field games, under the
Isaacs condition.
An interesting direction that we leave for future research is to extend the model to accom-
modate multiple classes of players and a drift function which may depend on the other players’
controls. Another direction would be to soften the conditions under which Proposition 5 is
valid, such as boundedness and Lipschitz continuity, and extend the result to games with non-
smooth coefficients. In this context, one could address a mean field central limit question on the
asymptotic behavior of the process
√
nE
(‖ xnj (t)− x˜j(t) ‖) . Yet another extension would be
to the time average risk-sensitive cost functional. Finally, the approach needs to be compared
with other risk-sensitive approaches such as the mean-variance criterion and extended to the
case where the drift is a function of the state-mean field and the control-mean field.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 5: Under the stated standard assumptions on the drift f and variance
σ, the forward stochastic differential equation has a unique solution adapted to the filtration
generated by the Brownian motions. We want to show that
E
(
sup
t∈[0,T ]
‖ xnj (t)− x˜j(t) ‖
)
≤ CT√
n
,
where CT is a positive number which only depends on the bounds, T and the Lipschitz constants
of the coefficients of the drifts and the variance term. First we observe that for a fixed control
u, the averaging terms 1
n
∑n
i=1 f(t, xj, u, xi) and
1
n
∑n
i=1 σ(t, xj, u, xi) are measurable, bounded
and Lipschitz with the respect to the state and uniformly with the respect to time.
Second, we observe that the bound on the Lipschitz constants of the coefficients do not depend
on the population size n.
Hence,
∫
f(t, x, u, x′) mt(dx′) and
∫
σ(t, x, u, x′) mt(dx′) are bounded and Lipschitz uni-
formly with the respect to t. Moreover, these coefficients are deterministic. This means that
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there is a unique solution to the limiting SDE and that solution is measurable with the filtration
generated by the mutually independent Brownian motions.
Third, we evaluate the gap between the coefficients in order to obtain an estimate of the two
processes. We start by evaluating the gap
E
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
f(t, x, u, xi)−
∫
f(t, x, u, x′) mt(dx′)
∥∥∥∥∥
2

Notice that f returns a k−dimensional vector and x belongs to Rk. By reordering the above
expression (in 2−norm), we obtain
k∑
l=1
var
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
fl(t, xj, u, xi)
)
≤ k
n
(1 + max
l
bl)
2 ≤ CT
n
,
where var(X) denotes the variance of X and bl is a bound on the l−th component of the drift
term. (This exists because we have assumed boundedness conditions on the coefficients).
Following a similar reasoning, we obtain the bounds on the second term in σ, i.e.,∑
l,l′
var
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
σll′(t, xj, u, xi)
)
≤ k
n
(1 + max
ll′
cll′)
2 ≤ CT
n
,
where cll′ is a bound on the entries (l, l′)− of the matrix σ.
Now we use the Lispchitz conditions and standard Gronwall estimates to deduce that the mean
of the quadratic gap between the two stochastic processes (starting from x at time 0) is in order
of 1
n
.
Proof of Theorem 1: Under the stated regularity and boundedness assumptions, there is
a solution to the McKean-Vlasov FPK equation. Suppose that (i) and (ii) are satisfied. Then,
mt = m
∗(t, u∗(t)) is the solution of the mean-field limit state dynamics, i.e., the macroscopic
McKean-Vlasov PDE when m is substituted into the HJB equation. By fixing f ∗, c∗, σ, we obtain
a novel HJB equation for the mean-field stochastic game. Since the new PDE admits a solution
according to (ii), the control u∗(t) = u(t, x) minimizing ∂xv · f + c, is a best response to m∗ at
time t. The optimal response of the individual player generates a mean-field limit which in law
is a solution of the FPK PDE and the players compute their controls as a function of this mean-
field. Thus, the consistency between the control, the state and the mean field is guaranteed by
assumption (i). It follows that (u∗,m∗) is a solution to the fixed-point problem i.e., a mean-field
equilibrium, and a strongly time-consistent one.
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Now, we look at the quadratic instantaneous cost case. In that case, we obtain the risk-sensitive
equations provided in Proposition 3. The fact that any convergent subsequence of best-response
to mn is a best response to m∗ and the fact that u∗ is an ∗−best response to the mean-field limit
m∗ follow from mean-field convergence of order O
(
1√
n
)
and the continuity of the risk-sensitive
quadratic cost functional.
Proof of Theorem 3:
We provide a sufficient condition for the risk-sensitive mean field game to have at most one
smooth solution. Suppose δ > 0, and σ is positive constant. Let H be the Hamiltonian associated
with the risk-neutral mean field system. Then the Hamiltonian for the risk-sensitive mean field
system is H˜(x, p,m) = H + ( σ
2
2δ
) ‖ p ‖2 . Assume that the dependence on m is local, i.e., it is
function of m(x).
The generic expression for the optimal control is given by u∗ = ∂pH(x, ∂xv,mt(x)) (note that
the generic feedback control is expressed in terms of H , and not of H˜).
Suppose that there exist two smooth solutions (vˆ1, mˆ1), (vˆ2, mˆ2) to the (normalized) risk-
sensitive mean field system. Now, consider the function t 7−→ ∫
x∈X (vˆ2(x) − vˆ1(x))(mˆ2(x) −
mˆ1(x))dx. Observe that this function is 0 at time t = 0 because the measures coincide initially,
and the function is equal to 0 at time t = T because the final values coincide. Therefore, the
function will be identically 0 in [0, T ] if we show that it is monotone. This will imply that
the integrand is zero, and hence one of the two terms (vˆ2(x) − vˆ1(x)) or (mˆ2,t(x) − mˆ1,t(x))
should be 0. Then, if the measures are identical, we use the HJB equation to obtain the result.
If the value functions are identical, we can use the FPK equation to show the uniqueness of
the measure. Thus, it remains to find a sufficient condition for monotonicity, that is, a sufficient
condition under which the quantity
∫
x∈X (vˆ2(x)− vˆ1(x))(mˆ2(x)−mˆ1(x))dx is monotone in time.
We compute the following time derivative:
S(t) :=
d
dt
[∫
x∈X
(vˆ2(x)− vˆ1(x))(mˆ2(x)− mˆ1(x))dx
]
.
We interchange the order of the integral and the differentiation and use time derivative of a
product to arrive at;
S(t) =
∫
x∈X
(∂tvˆ2 − ∂tvˆ1)(mˆ2(x)− mˆ1(x))dx+∫
x∈X
(vˆ2 − vˆ1)(∂tmˆ2(x)− ∂tmˆ1(x))dx
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Now we expand the first term A :=
∫
x∈X (∂tvˆ2 − ∂tvˆ1)(mˆ2(x) − mˆ1(x))dx. Consider the two
HJB equations:
∂tvˆ1 + H˜(x, ∂xvˆ1, mˆ1(x)) +
1
2
σ2∂2xxvˆ1 = 0,
∂tvˆ2 + H˜(x, ∂xvˆ2, mˆ2(x)) +
1
2
σ2∂2xxvˆ2 = 0
To compute A, we take the difference between the two HJB equations above and multiply by
mˆ2 − mˆ1, which gives
∂tvˆ2 − ∂tvˆ1 = −H˜(x, ∂xvˆ2, mˆ2) + H˜(x, ∂xvˆ1, mˆ1)− 1
2
σ2∂2xxvˆ2 +
1
2
σ2∂2xxvˆ1
Hence,
A :=
∫
x
[∂tvˆ2 − ∂tvˆ1](mˆ2(x)− mˆ1(x))dx
= −
∫
x
H˜(x, ∂xvˆ2, mˆ2)(mˆ2(x)− mˆ1(x))dx
+
∫
x
H˜(x, ∂xvˆ1, mˆ1)(mˆ2(x)− mˆ1(x))dx
−
∫
x
1
2
σ2∂2xx(vˆ2)(mˆ2(x)− mˆ1(x))dx
+
∫
x
σ2
1
2
∂2xx(vˆ1)(mˆ2(x)− mˆ1(x))dx
Next we expand the second term B :=
∫
x∈X (∂tmˆ2−∂tmˆ1)(vˆ2− vˆ1)dx. Note that the Laplacian
terms are canceled by integration by parts in the expression A+B. By collecting all the terms
in A+B, we obtain
A+B = −
∫
x
H˜(x, ∂xvˆ2, mˆ2)(mˆ2(x)− mˆ1(x))dx
+
∫
x
H˜(x, ∂xvˆ1, mˆ1)(mˆ2(x)− mˆ1(x))dx
+
∫
x
mˆ2(x)[∂pH(x, ∂xvˆ2, mˆ2)](∂xvˆ2 − ∂xvˆ1)dx
−
∫
x
mˆ1(x)[∂pH(x, ∂xvˆ1, mˆ1)](∂xvˆ2 − ∂xvˆ1)dx
Letting S(t) = A+B, we introduce
mˆλ := (1− λ)mˆ1 + λmˆ2 = mˆ1 + λ(mˆ2 − mˆ1).
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The measure mˆλ starts with mˆ1 for the parameter λ = 0 and yields the measure mˆ2 for λ = 1.
Similarly define
vˆλ := (1− λ)vˆ1 + λvˆ2.
Introduce an auxiliary integral parameterized by λ.
Cλ := −
∫
x
H˜(x, ∂xvˆλ, mˆλ)(mˆλ(x)− mˆ1(x))dx
+
∫
x
H˜(x, ∂xvˆ1, mˆ1)(mˆλ(x)− mˆ1(x))dx
+
∫
x
mˆλ(x)[∂pH(x, ∂xvˆλ, mˆλ)](∂xvˆλ − ∂xvˆ1)dx
−
∫
x
mˆ1(x)[∂pH(x, ∂xvˆ1, mˆ1)](∂xvˆλ − ∂xvˆ1)dx
Substituting the terms vˆλ − vˆ1 = λ(vˆ2 − vˆ1) and mˆλ − mˆ1 = λ(mˆ2 − mˆ1), we obtain
Cλ
λ
:= −
∫
x
H˜(x, ∂xvˆλ, mˆλ)(mˆ2(x)− mˆ1(x))dx
+
∫
x
H˜(x, ∂xvˆ1, mˆ1)(mˆ2(x)− mˆ1(x))dx
+
∫
x
mˆλ(x)[∂pH(x, ∂xvˆλ, mˆλ)](∂xvˆ2 − ∂xvˆ1)dx
−
∫
x
mˆ1(x)[∂pH(x, ∂xvˆ1, mˆ1)](∂xvˆ2 − ∂xvˆ1)dx
Using the continuity of the terms (of the RHS) above and the compactness of X , we deduce
that
lim
λ−→0
Cλ
λ
= 0.
We next find a condition under which the one-dimensional function λ 7−→ Cλ
λ
is monotone in
λ. We need to compute the variations of
d
dλ
(
Cλ
λ
)
.
Suppose that (x, p,m) 7−→ H˜(x, p,m) is twice continuously differentiable with the respect to
(p,m). Then,
d
dλ
(
Cλ
λ
)
= −
∫
x
[
∂pH˜(x, ∂xvˆλ, mˆλ)(∂xvˆ2 − ∂xvˆ1)
]
(mˆ2(x)− mˆ1(x))dx
−
∫
x
[
∂mH˜(x, ∂xvˆλ, mˆλ)(mˆ2(x)− mˆ1(x))
]
(mˆ2(x)− mˆ1(x))dx
+
∫
x
∂λ (mˆλ(x)[∂pH(x, ∂xvˆλ, mˆλ)]) (∂xvˆ2 − ∂xvˆ1)dx
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d
dλ
(
Cλ
λ
)
= −
∫
x
∂pH˜(x, ∂xvˆλ, mˆλ)(∂xvˆ2 − ∂xvˆ1)(mˆ2(x)− mˆ1(x))dx
−
∫
x
∂mH˜(x, ∂xvˆλ, mˆλ)(mˆ2(x)− mˆ1(x))2dx
+
∫
x
(mˆ2 − mˆ1)[∂pH(x, ∂xvˆλ, mˆλ)](∂xvˆ2 − ∂xvˆ1)dx
+
∫
x
mˆλ∂λ[∂pH(x, ∂xvˆλ, mˆλ)](∂xvˆ2 − ∂xvˆ1)dx
Computation of the term mˆλ(x)∂λ ([∂pH(x, ∂xvˆλ, mˆλ)]) yields
Dλ = ∂λ[∂pH(x, ∂xvˆλ, mˆλ)]
= ∂2ppH.(∂xvˆ2 − ∂xvˆ1) + ∂2mpH.(mˆ2 − mˆ1)
and we obtain
d
dλ
(
Cλ
λ
)
= −
∫
x
∂pH˜(x, ∂xvˆλ, mˆλ)(∂xvˆ2 − ∂xvˆ1)(mˆ2(x)− mˆ1(x))dx
−
∫
x
∂mH˜(x, ∂xvˆλ, mˆλ)(mˆ2(x)− mˆ1(x))2dx
+
∫
x
(mˆ2 − mˆ1)[∂pH(x, ∂xvˆλ, mˆλ)](∂xvˆ2 − ∂xvˆ1)dx
+
∫
x
mˆλ∂
2
ppH.(∂xvˆ2 − ∂xvˆ1)2 + mˆλ∂2mpH.(mˆ2 − mˆ1)(∂xvˆ2 − ∂xvˆ1)
The first and the third lines differ by
−
∫
x
(
σ2
δ
〈.,∇xvˆ〉
)
(∂xvˆ2 − ∂xvˆ1) (mˆ2(x)− mˆ1(x)) dx.
Hence, we obtain
d
dλ
(
Cλ
λ
)
=
∫
x
mλ(∂xvˆ2 − ∂xvˆ1, mˆ2 − mˆ1)
 a11 a12
a21 a22
 ∂xvˆ2 − ∂xvˆ1
mˆ2 − mˆ1
 dx,
where
a11 := ∂
2
ppH,
a21 :=
1
2
∂2mpH˜ =
1
2
∂2mpH −
σ2
2δ
p/m,
a21 :=
1
2
(∂2pmH˜)
′ − σ
2
2δ
p
m
=
1
2
(∂2pmH)
′ − σ
2
2δ
p
m
,
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a22 := −∂mH˜
m
.
Suppose that for all (x, p,m) ∈ X × Rd × R+, the matrix a11 a12
a21 a22
  0.
Then, the monotonicity follows, and this completes the proof.
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